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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by their attorney, Tony C. Baird, Deputy Cache County 
Attorney, and tenders their Appellee Brief in this appeal pursuant to Rule 24 U.R.A.P. as 
follows: 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT: 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-
3(2)(d) and (f), (1953 as amended). Pursuant to Rule 4 U.R.A.P. the Court has transferred 
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: 
Issue I: Whether Trooper Troy Denney lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the 
Defendant in his vehicle on March 10, 1997. 
Issue II: Whether the criminal information filed in the trial court sufficiently notified 
the Defendant of the charge of Unsafe Lane Change, under U.C.A. §41-6-69(l)(a), (1953, as 
amended). 
Issue III: Whether the trial court committed harmless error in sustaining the State's 
objection to defense counsel's questioning of Trooper Troy Denney regarding the metabolic 
burn-off/absorption rate of alcohol and its relevance to the Defendant's intoxilyzer result on 
the evening of March 10, 1997. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's findings of fact in a criminal bench trial are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard. See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 n.2 (Utah 1988). A trial 
court's finding is clearly erroneous when it is against the clear weight of the evidence or, 
although there is evidence to support it, the court reviewing all the record evidence is left 
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935, 939 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 
1993). The appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to 
the trial court's determination of law. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. 
GOVERNING STATUTES and RULES: 
A copy of the following statutes and rules cited herein is included in Addendum A to 
the Brief: 
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-44, 1953 as amended 
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-44.5, 1953 as amended 
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-69, 1953 as amended 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence 
2 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS: 
1. On the night of March 10, 1997, some time after 10:00 in the evening, 
Trooper Troy Denney of the Utah Highway Patrol observed the Defendant's 
vehicle, a Ford truck, proceeding eastbound on SR-142. (Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing at 6-7). The truck was traveling slower than the speed 
limit ten (10) to fifteen (15) miles per hour. This drew his attention and 
Trooper Denney began to follow the truck at a distance of two to three car 
lengths. He observed the truck's left hand blinker was on constantly for about 
ten (10) to fifteen (15) seconds, went off and then on again. This was odd to 
him. Finally, the truck made a left hand turn and began to travel northbound. 
(T. at 8). It continued at a slow pace, at about twenty-five (25) miles per hour 
under the speed limit. (T. at 9). The truck hugged the right side of the road 
and, at one point, the truck actually left the roadway to the right without 
signaling and nearly came to a complete stop. Afterwards, again without 
signaling, the truck entered the roadway, and continued to travel northbound. 
(T. at 9, 11). 
2. At the suppression hearing, Trooper Denney testified that he does not 
generally observe vehicles driving that slowly and based upon his experience 
found the signaling pattern of the truck unusual. (T. at 13-14). Trooper 
Denney considered that the truck was being driven by a local farmer, possibly 
looking at the rural fields. After continued observation, however, Trooper 
Denney excused this as a possibility. (T. at 16). 
3. Trooper Denney testified further at the suppression hearing that he believed 
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the driver of the truck had committed a traffic offense by failing to signal 
prior to leaving and entering the highway. T. at 15). 
4. After witnessing the traffic offense Trooper Denney made a traffic stop and 
identified the Defendant as the driver of the truck. 
5. Subsequently, the Defendant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol and Open Container. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant raises three issues for appeal. First, the Defendant challenges the 
legality of the stop, claiming that Trooper Denney did not possess a sufficient basis to pull 
him over on March 10, 1997. The un-contro verted testimony of Trooper Denney at the 
suppression hearing shows a per se traffic violation was committed in his presence. 
Therefore, the trial properly denied the Defendant's motion to suppress on this ground. 
Second, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the information, claiming that it 
did not properly notify him of the definition of Unsafe Lane Change found in U.C.A. §41-6-
69(l)(a), (1953, as amended). The State concedes that some language was not included from 
the relevant paragraph of the statute. However, despite this, the Defendant was sufficiently 
notified of the charge against him, and the record indicates that, in fact, he was aware of the 
offense in its entirety. 
Lastly, the Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in 
sustaining the State's objection to Defense counsel's examination of Trooper Denney with 
regard to the metabolic burn-off/absorption rate of alcohol in the human body and how this 
related to the Defendant's B.A.C. on the March 10, 1997. For purposes of this appeal, the 
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State concedes that the trial court erred, however, the State argues that any error was 
harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I: Whether Trooper Troy Denney lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the 
Defendant in his vehicle on March 10, 1997. 
The Defendant argues that "it was error for the trial court to find in the Trial that 
Trooper Denny had probable cause to stop the Defendant/Appellant's vehicle given that 
Trooper Denney had no reasonable articulable suspicion that the Defendant/Appellant had 
committed, or was about to commit, a traffic violation."1 (Appellant's Brief at 10). This 
argument is not supported by Utah law or the record in this case. First, under State v. Lopez, 
873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), a law enforcement officer need not have probable cause to make 
a traffic stop, reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a stop. 
An observed traffic violation gives the officer 'at least probable cause to 
believe the citizen had committed a traffic offense.' An observed violation, 
however, is not required. Stopping a vehicle may also be justified when the 
officer has 'reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a 
traffic offense... In the words of the United States Supreme Court, as 
long as an officer suspects that the 'driver is violating any one of the 
multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulation,' the police officer 
may legally stop the vehicle. 
State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)(citations omitted). 
Next, applying these Lopez principles to the trial court's finding of facts in the 
present case, it is apparent that the trial court properly denied the Defendant's motion to 
suppress. The trial court, among other findings, made the following findings of fact from the 
xThe State presumes that the Defendant means the suppression hearing and not "the Trial," as the 
challenge to the traffic stop was heard on May 12, 1997, not on August 8, 1997 at the trial. (T. at 5). 
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un-controverted testimony of Trooper Denney. First, the court found that Trooper Denney 
observed the Defendant traveling in his truck at a slow rate of speed at a late hour of night in 
a rural farm area, comprised of open fields and open roads. (T. at 26). The Defendant was 
traveling at twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) miles an hour while the speed limit was fifty (50) 
or fifty-five (55). Further, the court found that the Defendant traveled off the right side of 
the road and then re-entered without signaling. 
These facts support both an unusual driving pattern consistent with an impaired 
driver and a per se traffic violation under U.C.A. §41-6-69(l)(a), (1953 as amended.2) 
Trooper Denney not only had reasonable suspicion to make the stop but also had probable 
cause in that he observed the two traffic violations. Therefore, the trial court properly denied 
the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Lopez. The State respectfully 
requests this Court to uphold the same. 
ISSUE II: Whether the criminal information filed in the trial court sufficiently notified the 
Defendant of the charge of Unsafe Lane Change, under U.C.A. §41-6-69(l)(a), (1953, as 
amended). 
The Defendant claims that the criminal information in this case did not provide him 
with sufficient notice of the definition of the charge of Unsafe Lane Change under U.C.A. 
§41-6-69(l)(a), (1953 as amended). The Defendant does not contest the trial court's finding 
of fact that the Defendant failed to signal when he pulled off and then back on the highway. 
(T. at 87). Again, as with the Defendant's first argument, this argument is not supported by 
the law or the record in this case. 
2
"A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway or change lanes until the 
movement can be made with reasonable safety and an appropriate signal has been given" (emphasis 
added). 
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The import of the criminal information is notice to the defendant. According to Rule 
4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, an information "shall charge the offense for 
which the defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common 
law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give 
the defendant notice of the charge." "[W]hat the defendant is entitled to is an information 
which sufficiently informs him to enable him to understand the charge against him and to 
prepare a defense. If it fulfills that requirement, it is sufficient. It need not serve the purpose 
of discovery, nor constitute a statement of legal theories or conclusions or arguments." State 
v. Smathers. 602 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1979)(court found that criminal information 
sufficiently notified defendant of charge against him even though it failed to expressly state 
that the defendant caused serious bodily injury to the victim of a sexual assault). 
In the present case, the State concedes that Count 4 of the criminal information which 
charges Unsafe Lane Change failed to include the language "and an appropriate signal as 
been given," a portion of the language of U.C.A. § 41-6-69(l)(a), (1953 as amended). The 
question is whether without this language the information placed the Defendant on notice of 
the charge against him sufficient to prepare a defense. A review of the information and the 
record indicates that the Defendant was sufficiently notified of the charge to prepare a 
defense. To begin, the State refers this Court to the information itself. See Addendum B. 
Note, the information referred to the charge as "Unsafe Lane Change" and pinpoint cites the 
charge to U.C.A. § 41-6-69(l)(a), (1953 as amended). This pinpoint cite corresponds to a 
single paragraph, only thirty-four (34) words in length, which provides a single specific 
mode for committing the offense of unsafe lane change. Even a cursory reading of the 
paragraph would reveal that the "and an appropriate signal has been given" language is a 
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necessary element of the offense. The State presumes that counsel for the Defendant would 
have at least made a cursory viewing of the statute prior to trial and observed the entire 
language of the charge. For the above reasons alone, this Court should find that the criminal 
information in this matter sufficiently notified the Defendant of the charge against him. 
Additionally, however, the Defendant's conduct prior to and during the proceedings 
in this matter indicates that in fact he and his attorney were aware of the complete definition 
of the offense. One, at the suppression hearing, Trooper Denney testified that "[The 
Defendant]" didn't signal to leave the road nor did he signal to reenter the road. At that time 
I initiated a traffic stop." (T. at 9). In response to this testimony, the Defendant's attorney, 
cross-examined Trooper Denney emphasizing the signaling issue, and asked "[D]id you 
believe the defendant had committed any traffic violations?" 
Answer: "At what time?" 
Question: "Prior to the turn." 
Answer: Yeah, I did." 
Question: "Okay." 
Answer: "Where he left the road and did not signal." (T. at 15). 
Two, again at the suppression hearing, the State's attorney asked Trooper Denney the 
following: "To the best of your knowledge pulling off to the side of the roadway without 
indicating your blinker, to the best of your knowledge is that a violation of the law?" 
Answer: "Yes, it is." 
State's Attorney: "But did you observe him make a traffic violation?" 
Answer: "Yes, I did." 
State's Attorney: "And what was that?" 
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Answer: "It was that he did not use his turn signals." (T. at 20-21). 
In response to this questioning of Trooper Denney, the Defendant's attorney, on re-
cross-examination, again emphasized the signaling issue and confirmed with Trooper 
Denney that failing to signal was a traffic violation in Trooper Denney's opinion. (T. at 21). 
The record contains other instances where the issue of the Defendant's failure to 
signal was emphasized, at times by the Defendant's attorney. See T. at 34, 51, 56 and 60. 
The information sufficiently identified the charge to the Defendant for him to prepare 
a defense to the charge. The information on its face pinpoint cites the statute. The record 
shows the Defendant specifically treated this issue during the proceedings in this matter. It is 
in genuine for the Defendant to feign insufficient notice and prejudice at this time when the 
record clearly indicates knowledge of the elements of the offense. To grant the Defendant's 
request would be to elevate form over substance. The State, therefore, respectfully moves 
this Court to uphold the Defendant's conviction of Count 4, Unsafe Lane Change. 
ISSUE III: Whether the trial court committed harmless error in sustaining the State's 
objection to defense counsel's questioning of Trooper Troy Denney regarding the metabolic 
burn-off/absorption rate of alcohol and its relevance to the Defendant's intoxilyzer result on 
the evening of March 10, 1997. 
Lastly, the Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in 
sustaining the State's objection to Defense counsel's examination of Trooper Denney with 
regard to the metabolic burn-off/absorption rate of alcohol in the human body and how this 
related to the Defendant's B.A.C. on the March 10, 1997. In sustaining the State's objection, 
the trial court held, in effect, that U.C.A. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i), (1953 as amended) raises a 
conclusive presumption which limits a defendant in challenging the accuracy of the 
intoxilyzer result. For purposes of this appeal, the State concedes that the trial court erred in 
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sustaining the State's objection. However, any error by the court in this particular case was 
harmless and this court should uphold the Defendant's conviction under Count 2 of the 
criminal information, Driving with Breath/Blood Alcohol Concentration of .08 Grams or 
Greater and/or Being in Actual Physical Control, a violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44, (1953 as 
amended). 
The fact that a trial court commits error is not sufficient to justify the reversal of a 
conviction. First, the error must be preserved for appeal and, second, the error must be 
reversible error, not harmless. State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116, 120 (1989). When the error 
involves the erroneous exclusion of evidence, an appellate court should not set aside a 
verdict "unless a proffer of evidence appears of record, and [the court] believe[s] that the 
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict. Where it is unlikely that the excluded testimony prejudiced the defendant's 
rights in a substantial manner, the error is harmless and the case is not subject to reversal." 
State v. Rammel 721 P.2d 498, 499-500 (Utah 1986). 
In the present case, the Defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal. One, when 
the State made its objection and the Court upheld the objection, the Defendant's attorney 
agreed with the court's decision, stating, "That's right." (T. at 78). The Defendant took no 
exception to the court's ruling. Two, the Defendant failed to make an offer of proof as 
required by Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The Defendant merely agreed 
with the court and rested. (T. at 78-79). 
Next, assuming the issue is preserved for appeal, the State argues that the error was 
harmless. An error is harmless when "although properly preserved below and presented on 
appeal, [is] sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood 
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that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Verde, 770 P.2d at 120, In the 
p i c ,•«..! . .1 i • a t 
40, 45 and 49). On cross-examination by the Defendant, Trooper Denney testified, and the 
ii : •••::::.
 ;.itoxilyzer test was performed within O n C ' r l w U J and 
ten (10) minutes of stopping the Defendant in his truck. (T. at 45). See also T. at 70 (the 
Defendant agreed it was approximately an hour or a little more from the time of the stop to 
when he took the intoxilyzer test). The parties agreed that the recognized metabolic 
absorption/burn-off rate of alcohol for the human body is .015 per hour, or .00025 per 
was trying to establish that given the fact that the intoxilyzer test was given one (1) hour and 
ten (10) i nim it aidant 's B.i ' L.C. \ * as actuall} going up 
during that time, not down, the Defendant's B.A.C. may have been under .08 at the time he 
V- A- \ >pCI .1 . i l l : ' . ' . 
Even assuming, arguendo, the above facts are true, the math does not support a 
conclusion that the Defendant's ti.. * . was below .08 at the time he was driving. 
Approximately 70 minutes expired from the time of the stop to the time of the intoxilyzer 
test. 70 minutes times .00025 equals .0175, theoretically, the amount the Defendant 's B.A.C. 
would have increased in 70 minutes. Now, subtra»1 III '"':' ill iiuiinl nf inrir,isri f I « I MM 
(the Defendant 's intoxilyzer test result). The result is .0835 which, is still .0035 above the 
legal limit ot '• Therefore c \ m us .uiiiini tin IIIIIIIII.IIIIIII nil! n m I i I I! i n u ill I inn ill I  ninpu 
Denney 's testimony regarding the metabolic rate, this evidence would not have changed the 
Denney 's testimony was harmless. 
1 1 
The State, therefore, respectfully moves this court to uphold the Defendant's 
conviction under Count 2 of the information, Driving with Breath/Blood Alcohol 
Concentration of .08 Grams or Greater and/or Being in Actual Physical Control, a violation 
of U.C.A. §41-6-44, (1953 as amended). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court uphold the 
decision of the trial court. 
lis U> DATED thi  IV day of June, 1998 
Tony C. Baird 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct original and eight copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES, to the Utah Court of Appeals and two copies postage 
prepaid, this bt) day of June, 1998, to the following: 
GREGORY N. SKABELUND, #5346 
Attorney at Law 
2176 North Main Street 
Logan, UT 84321 
Tony C. Baird 
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H0905 Utah Code Sec. 41-6-44 negligent manner; or 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 
AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
Current through End of 1995 General and 1st Special 
Sessions 
Sec. 41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol 
concentration-Measurement of blood or breath 
alcohol-Criminal punishment-Arrest without 
warrant—Penalties—Suspension or revocation of 
license-Penalties 
(l)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given 
within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this 
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or 
a drug is not a defense against any charge of violating 
this section. 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the 
vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that 
of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that 
degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and 
prudent person exercises under like or similar 
circumstances. 
(c) In this section, a reference to this section 
includes any similar local ordinance adopted in 
compliance with Section 41-6-43. 
(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor 
more than 240 hours. 
•10906 (b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community-service 
work program for not less than 24 hours nor more 
than 50 hours. 
(c)(i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to participate in an assessment and educational 
series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the 
court may order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility if 
the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility determines that the person has a problem 
condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, 
and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second time of 
a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a 
proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a 
(5)(a) Upon a second conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of a prior violation under 
this section the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 
consecutive hours nor more than 720 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require 
the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than 80 hours nor more than 240 
hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to participate in an assessment and educational 
Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works. 
UT ST Sec. 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood 
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series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. The court may, 
in its discretion, order the person to obtain treatment 
at an alcohol or drag dependency rehabilitation 
facility. 
(6)(a) A third conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of two prior violations under this 
section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor iwLqr n 
Subsections (ii) and (7); and 
(ii) class A
 m j s ( i e m e a i l o r jf t>0th 0 f the prior 
convictions are for violations committed after April 
2 3 , 1990. 
(b)(i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part 
of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of 
not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours . 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jai l , require 
the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 
hours . 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(c)(i) Under Subsection (a)(ii) the court shall as part 
of any sentence impose a fine of not less than $1,000 
and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 
720 hours nor more than 2 ,160 hours . 
* 10907 (ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail , 
require the person to work in a community-service 
work program for not less than 240 nor more than 
720 hours , but only if the court enters in writing on 
the record the r e a s o n it finds the defendant should not 
serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and completion 
of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
program approved by the court may be a sentencing 
alternative to incarceration or community service if 
the program provides intensive care or inpatient 
treatment and long-term closely supervised follow 
through after the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(7)(a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of the prior 
violations under this section is a third degree felony if 
at least three prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 2 3 , 1990. 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a 
fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 
2,160 hours . 
(c)(i) r h e court may, as an alternative to jail , 
require the person to work in a community-service 
work program for not less than 240 nor more than 
720 hours , but only if the court enters in writing on 
the record the r ea son it finds the defendant should not 
serve the jail sentence. 
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by 
the court may be a sentencing alternative to 
incarceration or community service if the program 
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and 
long-term closely supervised follow through after the 
treatment. 
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(8)(a) The mandatory portion of any sentence 
required under this section may not be suspended and 
the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this 
section has been served. Probation or parole resulting 
from a conviction for a violation under this section 
may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license 
suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction 
under this section, until the convicted person has 
furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that: 
* 10908 (i) all required alcohol or drug dependency 
assessment, education, treatment, and rehabilitation 
ordered for a violation committed after July 1, 1993, 
have been, completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution 
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and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person 
have been paid, if the conviction is a second or 
subsequent conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or 
illegal manner as certified by a licensed alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the 
conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for 
a violation committed within six years of two prior 
violations committed after July 1, 1993. 
(9)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), 
and (7) that require a sentencing court to order a 
convicted person to: participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the 
discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, 
mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility; or do any 
combination of those things, apply to a conviction for 
a violation of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior 
conviction under Subsection (10). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding 
education or treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in 
connection with a first, second, or subsequent 
conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a 
prior conviction under Subsection (10), as the court 
would render in connection with applying 
respectively, the first, second, or subsequent 
conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), (6), 
and (7). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a 
conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualified as a 
prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a first, 
second, or subsequent conviction under this 
subsection, a previous conviction under either this 
section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior 
conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
program and any community-based or other education 
program provided for in this section shall be approved 
by the Department of Human Services. 
(10)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of 
guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of 
Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute 
for, an original charge of a violation of this section, 
the prosecution shall state for the record a factual 
basis for the plea, including whether or not there had 
been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of both, by the defendant in connection with the 
violation. 
* 10909 (ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the 
facts that shows whether there was consumption of 
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b)(i) The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the 
consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45 as 
follows. 
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty 
or no contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, 
and the prosecutor states for the record that there was 
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the 
violation, the resulting conviction is a prior conviction 
for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each 
conviction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior offense 
for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7). 
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest 
a person for a violation of this section when the 
officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the 
officer has probable cause to believe that the violation 
was committed by the person. 
(12)(a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a 
person convicted for the first time under Subsection 
(1); and 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person 
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection 
(1) if the violation is committed within a period of six 
years from the date of the prior violation. 
(b) The department shall subtract from any 
suspension or revocation period the number of days 
for which a license was previously suspended under 
Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was 
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As last amended by Chapters 159 and 263, Laws of 
Utah 1994 
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•10962 Utah Code Sec. 41-6-69 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
ARTICLE 8. TURNS AND SIGNALS ON 
STARTING, STOPPING OR TURNING 
Current through End of 1995 General and 1st Special 
Sessions 
Sec. 41-6-69. Turning or changing lanes-Safety-
Signals-Stopping or sudden decrease in speed-
Signal flashing-Where prohibited 
(l)(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right 
or left upon a roadway or change lanes until the 
movement can be made with reasonable safety and an 
appropriate signal has been given. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to 
change lanes shall be given continuously for at least 
the last three seconds preceding the beginning of the 
turn or change. 
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the 
speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate 
signal to the operator of any vehicle immediately to 
the rear when there is opportunity to give a signal. 
(3) The signals required on vehicles by Section 
41-6-70 may not be flashed on one side only on a 
disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or "do pass" to 
operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear, 
or flashed on one side only of a parked vehicle except 
as necessary to comply with this section. 
As last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987. 
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WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
Current with amendments received through 
11-15-97 
RULE 4. PROSECUTION < ) I I Mil \ 1 IC 
OFFENSES 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall 
be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn 
to by a person having reason to believe the 
offense has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge 
the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted by using the name given to the offense 
by common law or by statute or by stating in 
concise terms the definition of the offense 
sufficient to give the defendant notice of the 
charge. An information may contain or be 
accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to 
make out probable cause to sustain the offense 
charged where appropriate. Such things as time, 
place, means, intent, manner, value and 
ownership need not be alleged unless necessary to 
charge the offense. Such things as money, 
securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes 
and judgments may be described by any name or 
description by which they are generally known or 
by which they may be identified without setting 
forth a copy. However, details concerning such 
things may be obtained through a bill of 
particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor 
matters of judicial notice need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper 
language from an indictment or information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or 
information to be amended at any time before 
verdict if no additional or different offense is 
charged and the substantial rights of the defendant 
are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or 
information may be amended so as to state the 
offense with such particularity as to bar a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon 
the same set of facts. 
(e) When Lias not set out in an information or 
indictment are required to inform a defendant of 
the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as 
to enable him to prepare his defense, the 
defendant may file a written motion for a bill of 
particulars. The motion shall be filed at 
arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at 
such later time as the court may permit. The court 
may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a. bill 
of particulars. A bill of particulars may be 
amended or supplemented at any time subject to 
such conditions as justice may require. The 
request for and contents of a bill of particulars 
shall be limited to a statement of factual 
information needed to set forth the essential 
elements of the particular offense charged. 
*332 (f) An indictment or information shall not 
be held invalid because any name contained 
therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall i lot be necessary to negate any 
exception, excuse or proviso contained in the 
statute creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed 
according to their usual meaning unless they are 
otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal 
meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the 
conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment or 
information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence 
an indictment or information was based shall be 
endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to 
endorse shall not affect the validity but 
endorsement shall be ordered by the court on 
application of the defendant. Upon request the 
prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing 
of good cause, furnish the names of other 
witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not 
so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons 
shall issue directing it to appear before the 
magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or 
counsel. Proceedings against a corporation shall 
be the same as against a natural person. 
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WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Current with amendments received through 
11-15-97 
RULE 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not 
be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the 
party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion 
to strike appears of record, stating the specific 
ground of objection, if the specific ground was 
not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the 
evidence was made known to the court by offer 
or was apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked. 
(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The court may 
add any other or further statement which shows 
the character of the evidence, the form in which it 
was offered, the objection made, and the ruling 
thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in 
question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings 
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as 
to prevent inadmissible evidence from being 
suggested to the jury by any means, such as 
making statements or offers of proof or asking 
questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain Error. Nothing in this rule precludes 
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial 
rights although they were not brought to the 
attention of the court. 
Advisory Committee Note 
Rule 103 is the federal rule, verbatim, and is in 
conformity with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971), Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and Utah case law not involving 
constitutional considerations. Subsection (a)(1) is 
in accord with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) and Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 Utah 
2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). See also Bradford 
v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); 
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981). 
Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plain error 
rule. See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 
P.2d 512 (1968). 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOYD LEE PREECE, 
DOB: 07/09/42 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
) INFORMATION 
) Circuit Ct. No. 
) District Ct. No. 
:tq 
q-W HR^ 
The STATE OF UTAH, upon evidence and belief, charges the 




IN VIOLATION OF: 
CLASSIFICATION: 
AT: 
ON OR ABOUT: 
Operating or Being in Actual Physical Control 
of a Vehicle While Under the Influence of 
Alcohol and/or Drugs 
Section 41-6-44 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 
Class B Misdemeanor 
Cache County, State of Utah 
March 10, 1997 
The acts of the Defendant constituting the public offense were: 
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, did 
wilfully and unlawfully operate or was in actual physical 
control of a vehicle in the State of Utah while under the 
influence of alcohol and/or drugs to a degree which rendered 
him incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
COUNT 2: 
CRIME 
IN VIOLATION OF: 
CLASSIFICATION: 
AT: 
ON OR ABOUT: 
Driving with Breath/Blood Alcohol 
Concentration of .08 grams or Greater and/or 
Being in Actual Physical Control 
Section 41-6-44 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 
Class B Misdemeanor 
Cache County, State of Utah 
March 10, 1997 
m i -11? 
-j_-n^ _:.t constituting the public offense were: 
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, did 
wilfully and unlawfully operate or was in actual physical 
control of a vehicle in the State of Utah with a breath/blood 
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater. 
COUNT 3: 
CRIME: 
IN VIOLATION OF: 
CLASSIFICATION: 
AT: 
ON OR ABOUT: 
Open Container of Alcohol in Vehicle 
Section 41-6-44.20 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 
Class C Misdemeanor 
Cache County, State of Utah 
March 10, 1997 
The acts of the Defendant constituting the public offense were: 
That the said Defendant, on the d^ v ,^ id place aforesaid, did 
keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to keep, 
carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of 
a motor vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any 
container which contains any alcoholic beverage and the 
container has been opened, its seal broken, or the contents of 




 V I O L A T I O N O F : 
CLASSIFICATION: 
AT: 
ON OR ABOUT: 
Unsafe Lane Change 
Section 41-6-69(1)(a 
Class C Misdemeanor 
Cache County, State of 
March 10, 1997 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended 
T h p • f c h ' N-fendrj in- I 1 1 • u L l L. t f r- II i i i : W t ' I H 
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, 
driver of a vehicle, did move right or left upon a roadway or 
change lanes, when such movement could not be made with 
reasonable safety. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following 
witnesses: T. Denney, F. Peterson. 
&£> 
Dated: April /r****-. 1 997. 
DEPUTY CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Drap 
Date Filed: April ^\ 1997 
